

Fiscal Rules

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- 1. Why Fiscal Rules?
- 2. Effectiveness
- 3. Challenge
- 4. Lessons Learned



1. Why Fiscal Rules?

Public Debt Developments

- Public debt has risen by more than tripled in advanced economies during the last 40 years.
- The next 35 years aging population will increase public spending in advanced economies by 5 percentage points of GDP, further adding to Deficits and Debt.

120 100 80 **Advanced Economies** 60 40 20 Euro Area Economies $\left(\right)$ 1973 1976 1979 1985 1985 1988 1988 1994 1997 1997 1997 2003 2003 2003 2006 2005 2005 2015 2015

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (2018). * Weighted Average; Preliminary estimates.




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Public Debt (in percent of GDP), 1950-2017*

The Role of Discretionary Fiscal Policies



 Countries tend to pursue more fiscal stabilization during downturns than upturns.




Fiscal Rules for Fiscal Discipline – a Country Perspective

• *Fiscal rules* are numerical constraints on key indicators of fiscal policy.

- Fiscal Rules Help Address:

 Short-sightedness of Political Process.
 Debt Bias.
 - 3. Pro-cyclicality Bias.





Fiscal Rules for Fiscal Discipline – Euro Area Perspective


In Euro Area, Stronger Need for Fiscal Rules,

Because ...

Monetary union requires coordination to avoid unsustainable fiscal policies in member countries...


Therefore ...

Fiscal Rules are a cornerstone of the Euro Area Architecture. 10-year Bond Yields, 1985-2018 (percent)





Growing Popularity of Fiscal Rules



Source: IMF Fiscal Rules Database.

Euro Area Fiscal Rules

Key Elements of the Euro Area Fiscal Rule


- Deficit Ceiling of 3% of GDP.
- Public Debt Anchor at 60% of GDP.
- Country-specific medium-term targets in cyclically adjusted terms (MTOs)
- Annual adjustments toward MTOs
- Debt reduction benchmark stipulating that the distance to the 60% threshold be reduced by 5% on average per year.
- Expenditure benchmark.



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Recent Trends in Rules




Post-GFC Rules Fiscal Rules Features, 1995–2015 80 Criticism Example Response Legal basis Formal 70 enforcement above procedures statutory level Too Rigid for Increased Escape clauses and 60 **Stabilization** Flexibility flexibility for Corrected for Number of countries 50 growth-enhancing the cycle Independent reforms body **Escape clauses** 40 monitoring Low compliance More Correction fiscal rules 30 enforceable mechanisms and fiscal councils 20 Too Complicated for Expenditure rules More 10 guiding fiscal policy * operational 0 * For example, the Vade Mecum on the SGP alone provides 220-page long 2015 2005 1995 2015 1995 2005 1995 2015 guidance.

Source: IMF fiscal rule database.

Note: All countries considered in this chart have, at least, one fiscal rule. Rules "corrected for the cycle" include cyclically-adjusted balance rules, structural balance rules, over-the-cycle balance rules, and expenditure rules excluding cyclical items. Total number of countries with at least one fiscal rule are 23, 72, and 92 in 1995, 2005, and 2015 respectively.

Flexibility Made Simpler

Countries Adopting Expenditure Rule, 1994-2015



Number of countries adopting expenditure rule (RHS)

Alternative approaches to flexibility

 Expenditure growth rules often strike a better balance between simplicity and flexibility

 Flexibility provisions should be more prevalent.
 Design matters to avoid abuse!





2. Effectiveness

Average Effectiveness




- *Positive correlations* between fiscal rules and budget balances...
- ... but causality difficult to establish
 - After correcting for endogeneity, no difference between rule adopters and nonadopters.
 - ✓ "Average rule" does not impact fiscal balance of an "average country".
- Significant heterogenous effects across rules and countries.

... But Effective as a Pulling Force, Even in Case of Noncompliance




Probability Distribution of Deficits



Different Impacts Across Rules



Sweden: General Government Finances Following Rule Adoption, 1992-2016 (Percent of GDP)




Successful rule design -Sweden

- Broad institutional coverage
- Consistent/good calibration.
- Builds buffers in good times
- Supporting institutions (Fiscal Council, sound PFM)
- Political buy-in



3. Challenge

A. Multiplicity of Fiscal Rules



Pitfalls of multiple rules

- **Overlap** between rules (creates operational and political economy problems)
- **Inconsistency** between rules' ceilings
- **Overdetermined** systems (leads to suboptimal policies)
- Lack of credibility

Source: IMF fiscal rules dataset.


Note: Based on a constant country sample (including countries with no rule at some point during the period).

B. More Flexibility at the Expense of Complexity





Real-Time Underestimation of the Output Gap in Europe (In ppts; 2003-16)




Sources: AMECO database (ex post data), and stability programs (real time estimates).

C. Poor Compliance Track Record



Evolution of Number of EU Countries under the EDP





4. Lessons Learned

Lessons from Country Experiences



What makes rules effective?

- Strong and enduring political consensus and buy-in.
- Broad institutional and economic coverage.
- Simple design conducive to countercyclical fiscal policy.
- A good calibration.
- Well-defined escape clauses against tail events.
- Effective enforcement mechanism (e.g. fiscal councils).

Lessons from Country Experiences



- Politics is Key.
- An Expenditure Growth Rule With a Debt Anchor Strikes a Good Balance between Flexibility and Simplicity.



Thank You!